Encouraging Successful Technology Transition

Presentation to NAS Performance Workshop

Prof. Annalisa L. Weigel with thanks to Dr. Karen Marais, Norma Campos, Jenny Hu Massachusetts Institute of Technology April 15, 2009

Why Technology Transition is Hard


- Aviation stakeholders
 - Multiple independent yet interdependent stakeholders
 - Mix of commercial, private, public, and government
 - Differing motivations (profit, safety, etc.)
- Technology
 - Expensive
 - Takes a long time to deploy; long in-service times
 - Technology changes faster than it can be deployed
- System attributes
 - Network externalities
 - Free-rider problems
 - Market failures
- Multiple stakeholders must change concurrently in a coordinated fashion to achieve real system-wide benefits

Motivation

- Past performance gains in the NAS achieved by actions of a single or few stakeholder(s)
- Unlikely to continue to be the case
- Need to understand how to think about complex interdependent technology transitions in a multistakeholder context over long periods of time

Central Research Question: How can aircraft operators be encouraged to adopt new technologies?

ADS-B Out Example




Presentation Agenda

- Technology transition policy levers
- Determinants of equipage value
- Strategy preferences depends on equipage situation need to segment incentive strategies
- Three approaches to analyzing challenges with technology transitions
 - Value analysis approach
 - Cost benefit distribution and imbalance problems
 - Phased value arrival and risk problems
 - Cost benefit time lag problems
 - Network effects approach
 - Game theoretic approach
- Epilogue: The case for change is more than ROI


Why Policy Levers are Needed

- Reduce value imbalances and uncertainties
- Remedy various market failures inherent in network markets
- Overcome stakeholder reluctance
- Stakeholders reluctant if:
 - Costs are high
 - Perception that benefits are limited, doubtful, may be delayed, short-lived, or free rider option
- Stakeholders enthusiastic if:
 - Costs are low relative to benefits
 - Perception that benefits are pervasive, rapid, clear, long-lived, no free rider option
- Focusing on aircraft operators, as frequent limiting factor on successful technology transitions


Five Policy Levers



Value Determinants of Adopting Equipage and Effects of Policy Levers



Argument for Segmenting Incentives



Strategies according to airlines 100% equipped with FANS-1/A (7 total)

Strategies according to airlines partially equipped with FANS-1/A (14 total)

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
Technology transition policy levers

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Value Analysis Approach


Broadly Examine Costs and Benefits Value = (Benefits / Costs)



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
Value Distribution

How are costs and benefits distributed between stakeholders?




Looking at costs and benefits in this way can reveal imbalances in how they are distributed

ADS-B Stakeholder Benefit and Cost Distribution



Time-Phased Value Analysis

- Show how costs & benefits accrue over implementation phases for different stakeholders
- Identify cost and benefit realization risks




Positive long-term NPV necessary but may not be sufficient

- Time to positive ROI excessive
- Uncertainty in costs/benefits excessive


Value Over Time

How are costs and benefits distributed over time?




Consider different types of cost E.g., installation, training, operation


ADS-B Cost Distribution Over Time



ADS-B Benefit Distribution Over Time





Accelerating Benefits and Delaying Costs Addresses Time-phased Value Distribution




- Investment more attractive if benefits more quickly realized
- Positive NPV over short term is better, especially when costs are high
- Delay costs
 - Aviation agency pays for initial installations, provides discounts
- Accelerate benefits
 - Rapid ground equipment deployment when ground equipment required
 - Coordinated effort across airlines when strong network effects

Policy Levers Selection for Value Timing









Timing	Costs and benefits coincide	Costs precede benefits	Long delay to benefits
Scenario Examples	Individual adoptions provide benefits.	Benefits realized only when other A/C equipped. Delays in ground infrastructure deployment.	Benefits realized only when <i>many</i> other A/C equipped. Long delays to ground infrastructure deployment.
Strategies	Significant benefits realized concurrently with costs provides incentive to aircraft operators to invest. When short-term benefits are smaller than costs, positive incentives may be needed to improve the value case.	May be possible to make ROI cases based on operational benefits of technology without resorting to positive incentives such as discounts and financing schemes.	Pioneer schemes, positive incentives, and mandates. Strong incentives and aid schemes in addition to technology benefit are needed to mitigate the slow ROI.
Comments	Great situation, but rarely occurs.	More realistic scenario.	When benefits take this long to realize it may be a signal that the proposed technology solution is not appropriate.

Network Effects Approach






		t Leverage Strategies for Different			
Network Effects					
	# ATC, Radars etc.				
# Aircraft		1. Aircraft operators have immediate incentive to invest, assuming positive NPV General Aviation for ABS-B	4. Aviation agencies must lead the way by first installing the minimum ground infrastructure and can then rely on positive value case to encourage adoption. Positive incentives may be		
			needed to offset poor short term cost- benefit cases.		
		2. As long as final cost-benefit case positive, aircraft operators have incentive to invest (e.g., RVSM).			
		3. Pioneer scheme and poeitive incentives.	5. Aviation agencies must lead the way by first installing the minimum ground infrastructure and then use pioneer schemes and positive incentives.		
	Commercial Aviation for ADS-B				

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Game Theory Approach

Games and Findings




Assumptions:

- Free market conditions
- No bargaining or side payments, so no coalitions in airline to airline game
- Groups act as coalitions in major carriers to other airspace users and major airlines to FAA games

Using Policy Levers to Address Market Failures

Market Failures: -

- Public Goods Market Failure
- Asymmetry of Costs and Benefits
- Asymmetry of Information
- Risk Dominance
- Organizational Process
 Difficulties
- Pressure on Government Budgets




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Delivering Value is More Than Balancing Costs and Benefits



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