NEXTOR Annual Research Symposium November 14, 1997

Session III Issues for the Future of ATM

Synthesis of a Future ATM Operational Concept Aslaug Haraldsdottir, Boeing

ATM Concept Baseline Definition

Aslaug Haraldsdottir et.al.

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Introduction

"This statement of work describes a task that will define and document the probable evolution of the National Airspace System (NAS) through the year 2015, based on current documents and on-going work by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), and industry."

> (Project Statement of Work, drafted December 1996) (Work commenced in early May 1997)

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Project Participants

- FAA Operational Concept Development Team
- NASA Ames, AATT Program
- Boeing Commercial Airplane Group (Seattle)
- NEXTOR (FAA Center of Excellence in ATM Operations Research)
 - MIT
 - Berkeley




Preliminary Design Questions

- How big should it be?
 - capacity, access
- How much can it cost?
 - capital investment, operational efficiency, productivity and maintenance
- How well must it perform?
 - safety, sustainability




Mission, Requirements, Concepts and Architecture



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NAS Capacity Study - Notional Capacity Effects



Source: American Airline NAS Capacity Study, 1997

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NAS Capacity Study Conclusions


Cost Avoidance as Basis of Infrastructure Investment 4% Percent Growth in Enplanements and 2.3% Annualized Traffic Growth Airspace Delays will Dramatically Constrain Airline Operations and Scheduling Opportunities in the Next Decade Northeast "triangle", Southeast and Southwest Regions Acute Reducing Separations (7 nm to 3 nm En Route; 4 nm to 2 nm in the Terminal; Wake Vortex from 4.5-1.9 to 2.5-1.5) and Adding Departure Runways can Provide 25+ Years of Operation

Source: American Airline NAS Capacity Study, 1997

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ATM System Functional Structure



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Separation Standard and Performance Factors

urce-Constrained	Effective	Theoretical	Effective	Resource-Constrained
tervention Rate	Intervention De	etection A		
play ather dium-Term Intent a Controller mm: g/g t w Rates space Complexity	Sensor Display Short-Term Intent Controller Comm: a/g Pilot Closure Rate	Sensor Display Controller Pilot		
	Required Element Performance			


RxP = f (sensors, decision support, human)

Required System Performance sets Separation Standard

RSP = g(RCP, RMP, RNP)

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
Alternative Operational Concepts

Traffic Planning Horizon

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
Proposed CNS/ATM Technologies



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Future System Thrusts

- Uniform CNS Infrastructure Throughout NAS
- Performance-Based Access to Airspace and Services
- Airspace Configured Dynamically Based on Density Level
- Precision Trajectory-Based Separation Assurance
- User Flexibility in Low Density Airspace
- Collaborative Flow Management
- Separation Assurance Remains Shared Between Air and Ground



Conclusions

- 1 Traffic growth predictions indicate NAS traffic gridlock by 2006
 - terminal area will be the primary choke point
 - airline hubbing operations become infeasible
 - costs escalate and economic growth is hampered
- 2 Current approach to NAS modernization will not accommodate the predicted growth
 - pace is too slow to respond to market needs
 - system development process is inadequate
 - technology driven to point solutions



Recommendations

- 1 NAS capacity must be increased
 - additional/reliever airports and runways, and
 - higher terminal area traffic density
 - improvements in communications, navigation and surveillance for reduced separations
 - changes in the separation assurance work system to achieve capacity goals
 - coordinated traffic flow management that supports higher capacity and efficiency
- 2 A major change is needed in the system development process
 - high-level trades before major design decisions
 - concept validation must incorporate human factors and technology
 - determine level of risk and criticality requirements, ground and air

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