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#### Technology Policy and Economic Growth in Air Transportation:

#### <u>Towards</u> Metrics & Investment Incentives

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CENTER FOR AIR TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS RESEARCH



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### Motivation 1

- JPDO: What are *investment incentives* for industry (airlines, vendors) in ATS modernization (e.g. NGATS)?
- What is the *Return on an Investment*?
- What are Costs and Benefits of modernization?
- What is *impact of modernization initiatives* on the Air Transportation System (ATS)?
- What are *Economics of ATS*?

### Motivation 2

- ATO Strategic Management Process
  - 4.1 Assure a Sustainable Air Traffic System

- 4.5 Develop Alternative Biz Concepts

- Sustainability by definition is the ability to adapt to emerging changes as part of the process
  - Ability to predict, change, innovate
  - Process Maturity (Humphreys)
    - 1-Chaotic, 2-Repeatable, 3-Deterministic, 4-Robust, 5-Innovative)
- Metric for Sustainability of the Air Traffic System
   Leads to alternative biz concepts

### Motivation 3

- Interactions and dynamics of ATS are not well understood
  - Media, political staffers, managers & engineers in supply chain


# Note on Metrics Philosophy

- Categories of Metrics
  - 1. States of network System
    - e.g. # Aircraft in Taxi-out Queue, #ATCS
  - 2. Performance of Network System
    - e.g. Productivity, Throughput, Delays, Indicies
  - 3. <u>Explanatory/Diagnostic Performance of</u> <u>Network System</u>
    - e.g. Network Velocity Metric


### **Research Approach**

- Develop model of ATS (Morrison & Winston, Button, Goldner/Knorr/Yablonski/NEXTOR, Janic, ...)
  - Agents in economic system:
    - Passengers/Cargo, Airlines, Airports, Airspace, Air Traffic Control, Homeowners near Airports, Citizens, Wildlife
  - Functions/Dynamics of ATS Model:
    - 1. demand/supply relationships (Morrison & Winston, Bernadino)
      - » Includes dynamics (e.g. time constants)
    - 2. signals that balance demand/supply relationships (Golaszewski)
    - 3. market forces that drive signals (Porter)
    - 4. innovation mechanisms (Burgelman)
- Use Model to conduct to:
  - Develop metric(s)
  - Investment Incentives/Strategies (van den Poel)


### Scope of ATS Model




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
### Supply/Demand Relationships





#### **Time Constants**



### Signals







Weak Signaling 12 No Equilibrium

## Signals

Supply/Demand Relationships	Signals	Signal Strength (Slope Supply/Demand)	
Air Navigation Service	• Delays (GS, GDPs, MIT)	Strong	
Providers		Air Traffic Flow capped by Airport Departure Rates and Arrival Rates	
to			
Airspace/Airports (Air-side)			
Homeowners and Public	• Emissions and Noise Penalties	Weak	
Natural Resources	Heath Costs	Scheduled Operations impacted very	
to		little by Noise and Emissions penalties. Problem Ambiguous limits.	
Airlines/Airports (Land-side)		penalties. Troblem Ambiguous innits.	
Airspace/Airports (Air-side)	• Ticket Tax,	Weak	
to	Historic Delay Operating Costs	Scheduled Operations demand is	
Airlines/Airports (Land-side)	Noise/Emissions Procedural Costs	regulated very little by fees set under assumption of infinite resources in presence of strong sustainable	
	Marketshare Imperative Costs	demand, delaysetc.	
Airlines/Airports (Land-side)	Operating Costs	Strong	
to	• Landing Fees, Taxes, …	Passenger and Freight demand is	
Regional Markets	<ul> <li>Delays/Cancellations</li> </ul>	strongly regulated to meet limit of Seats/Weight	
	<ul> <li>Parking, Ground</li> </ul>	, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,	
	Transportation, Concessions,	13	

### Market Forces on Signals

Market Forces on Signals Between Service Provider & Consumer

1) Bargaining Power of Buyers

2) Bargaining Power of Suppliers

- 3) Threat of New Entrants
- 4) Rivalry between Existing Firms
- 5) Threat of Substitute Services

6) Regulation

### Market Forces on Signals

Market Forces Service Provider	1) Power of Buyers	2) Power of Service Provider	3) Threat of New Entrants	5) Threat of Substitute Services	6) Regulation
Air Navigation Service Providers [Very Profitable]	Low	High • Labor market artificially controlled • Safety card	Low. Class A vs. Class G •Canadian/Mexican Airspace vs. US •Super-high vs Class A	Low	High (ADR, AAR)
Homeowners and Public Natural Resources [No profits]	High	Low <ul> <li>distributed</li> </ul>	N/A	N/A	Low • Capacity to regulate high
Airspace/Airports (Air- side) [Potentially Very Profitable	Low	High • Maintenance of Equipment	Low	High <ul> <li>substitute</li> <li>technologies to</li> <li>Radar Surveillance</li> </ul>	Low (except for Slot Controlled Airports)
<b>Airlines</b> [ Low Profits due to Buyers and Competition]	High & Low • subject to fluctuations	High •airlines seek best markets, leases	High	High - other modes of transportation	Low
Airports (Land-side) [High Profits]	Low – long-range biz	Med	Low	Low •High for short-range other modes of transportation	Low
Regional Markets	Medium – Biz	Low	Medium <ul> <li>competition from other cities</li> </ul>	N/A	N/A 15

### Economics of ATS

Economic Properties Service Provider	Impact of Signals from Suppliers Under Current System	Profits & Incentive to Innovate Under Current System	Maturity Level
Air Navigation Service Providers	Strong – Capacity limits lost in noise of weather and schedule variability	Very High – No competition, no price pressures Low	4-Robust
Homeowners and Public Natural Resources	Weak –distributed, media and ambiguous data	None – No property rights, just costs	?
Airspace/Airports (Air-side)	Weak – fees set for infinite resources (except slot controlled airports)	Low – ATNS supplier power, threat of sub technology Low	4-Robust
Airlines	Strong – airfares regulate demand	Low - Competition, supply chain costs (e.g. fuel) High – pressure from all sides	5-Innovative
Airports (Land-side)	Weak – revenue neutrality allows cross-subsidization	Medium – no sub, no comp, but supplier pressure Low – competing based on cost, subsidized by parking, …	3-Deterministic
Regional Markets		?	?

### Impact of Modernization Initiatives & Benefits/Costs

Service Provider	Modernization Initiatives	Impact on ATS (Signals and Industry Structure)	Benefits/Costs
Air Navigation Service Providers	<ul> <li>Automate "Sequencing" &amp; Conflict Resolution tasks (e.g. Evaluator)</li> <li>Transfer "Separation" to aircraft</li> </ul>	None	• Reduced Ops Cost (Breakeven point when savings in Ops Costs > Development Costs ?)
Homeowners and Public Natural Resources	<ul> <li>Reduced Noise footprint off RNP routes</li> <li>Increased Noise/Emissions on RNP Routes</li> </ul>	None	None
Airspace/Airports (Air- side)	<ul> <li>Potentially reduce F&amp;E Costs</li> <li>Increase Capacity on RNP Routes</li> </ul>	None	<ul> <li>Reduced F&amp;E costs</li> <li>Increase capacity on RNP routes</li> </ul>
Airlines	<ul> <li>Perform "Separation" tasks</li> </ul>	None	<ul> <li>Potential benefits from differentiated service</li> <li>Additional costs</li> </ul>
Airports (Land-side)	None	None	None
Regional Markets	<ul> <li>Enhanced capacity</li> </ul>	None	Additional costs (passed on from Airlines) 17

### Investment Incentives – "Modernization"

- "Modernization Plans"
  - <u>No change</u> in industry structure
  - <u>No change</u> in signaling
  - No change in incentives for investment
  - Reduced Ops Costs: ANSP (Ops), Airspace (F&E)
  - "Separation task" transferred to airlines without transfer of costs
    - Airlines remain not incentivized to equip
  - Investment incentives for ANSPs, Airspace, and Airport (Airside) Supply Chain for Government Contracts
- Strategy to be investigated: Differentiated Service

#### Investment Incentives – Strong Signals

**Preliminary Findings** 

- "Strong Signals" ATS:
  - Airports (Landside)
    - Make gates available to all carriers, User fees priced at marginal costs
  - Airports (Airside) & Airspace
    - Set efficient (marginal cost) takeoff and landing congestion tolls, Improve productivity to supply/demand equilib.
  - ANSP
    - Charge users marginal costs of services, Improve productivity to supply/demand equib.
- Long-term (20+ years) sustainable:
  - high rates of innovation (continuous capacity increase)
  - more robust, response to perturbations (e.g. fuel)
  - Airfares slightly higher
  - Social/External Costs reduced
- Pathway: Cost Transparency → User Fees →(Congestion) Tolls →Auction Pricing

### Future Work

- Design and compute "Sustainability" Metric(s) for ATO
- Derive Strategy to migrate from 4-Robust to 5-Innovative
- Derive Investment Incentive Strategies
  - Understand impact of differentiated service
    - Signals
    - Industry structure
      - Profits
      - Innovation Incentives
  - Understand impact on Equal Access, Appropriations Process
- Create awareness and educate (non-domain) decisionmakers on behavior of ATS