#### **FAA-NEXTOR**

# **NAS/ATM** Performance Indexes

Dr. Alexander (Sasha) Klein







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# **Project Objectives**

Develop a framework for assessing NAS/ATM performance on a recurring / daily basis

- Come up with a simple yet informative index of weather-related ATM performance on a given day ("one number")
- Produce charts for each season
- Compare different seasons: "Did we do better this year than last year?"

Account for major external factors:

- Weather
- Traffic Demand

Enhance existing methods for NAS performance analysis

- Refine computation of the effects of both en-route and terminal weather
- Consider additional metrics alongside Delay









### ORI for 366 Days 01/01 – 12/31/2004, sorted by Date





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### Weather-Impacted Traffic Index (WITI) Combined En-Route and Terminal Wx



#### En-Route WITI:

- Find intersections of each flow (GC track) with hex cells where convective Wx was reported
- Multiply by each hex cell's total NCWD count (reflects Wx duration) and by # of daily flights on this flow
- Add up all flows: En-Route WITI

#### Terminal WITI:

- Hourly surface Wx observations at major airports
- Capacity degradation % for each Wx type \* hourly movement rate
- Add up all airports: Terminal WITI

Combined WITI (CWITI):

- Weighted sum of En-route and Terminal WITI
- Reflects "front-end" impact of Wx on intended flights



#### Combined WITI and NAS Performance Metrics Example: ORI & Delays, June-Oct 2004 Including Outliers





### ORI and Delays vs. Combined WITI Example 1: Convective Weather



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### Zooming In on July 14, 2004... ORI, En-Route and Terminal WITI





#### ORI and Delays vs. Combined WITI Example 2: Non-Convective Weather



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### Zooming In on October 20, 2004... ORI, En-Route and Terminal WITI





En-route WITI is low (late October)

**But Terminal WITI** is very high (rain, low ceilings etc)

So the Combined WITI is high

That is, high ORI (\$/flight) and delays were caused mostly by terminal Wx

NAS performance was actually good for this "IMC day"

(Better in terms of delays than costs)



### ORI and Delays vs. Combined WITI Example 3: Two Metrics Yield Different Results





### Comparing Delays for 2004 and 2005 May-September



2005 delays were on average about the same as in 2004 (1% diff.)



But, weather (CWITI) was on average *better* in May-Sep 2005 (If 2004 average = 100, then 2005 average = 83)



# Normalized Delay-to-Wx Ratio Comparison

Delay-Based NAS/ATM Performance Index, '05 vs.'04



Normalized ASPM Arr Delay vs Weather, May-Sep 2004 and 2005 Against 2004 Trendline (all days, including hurricane-impacted)





#### Delays and Traffic Demand Taking Exponential Delay-vs.-Demand Factor into Account

- Looking at 1990-2005 historical monthly averages...
- 2005: a 10% traffic increase
- <u>10%</u> increase in traffic (from 4.3M to 4.7M ops) can lead to a <u>45%</u> increase in delays (from 1.25M to 1.8M minutes)
- This factor ought to be taken into account when we talk about NAS / ATM performance
- The trend <u>doesn't</u> depend on weather
- Adjusted chart is shown on next slide



![](_page_14_Picture_9.jpeg)

![](_page_14_Picture_10.jpeg)

![](_page_15_Figure_0.jpeg)

2004 benchmark = 100 2005 average *adjusted for Weather only* = 120

Adjustment factor: divide by 145% (exponential delay increase rate), multiply by 110% (traffic increase rate; need to pro-rate 2005 back to 2004)

2005 *adjusted-for-Weather-and-Demand* average = 120 / (1.45 / 1.1) = 91

![](_page_15_Figure_4.jpeg)

#### Discussion Delays

![](_page_16_Picture_1.jpeg)

#### Did the NAS/ATM do 9% better in 2005 than in 2004?

- NAS delays were similar; delays vs. weather were worse in 2005...
- But, relative to weather *and* traffic demand, the ATM component of the NAS *did* do better in 2005 than in 2004
- D-RVSM and other measures may have helped

Even so,

- We are on the ascending slope of the exponential delay curve
- Peak delays in bad weather (July 2005) were highest ever
- Delay *variance* is significant
- The exact proportion (45% delay increase due to 10% traffic demand growth) needs to be fine tuned

![](_page_16_Figure_11.jpeg)

![](_page_16_Picture_12.jpeg)

#### ORI: Cost-to-Wx Ratio The Ruler for ORI (100) is an **Averaged** Day

![](_page_17_Picture_1.jpeg)

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# Conclusions

![](_page_18_Picture_1.jpeg)

Delay, cost (ORI) and weather (WITI) metrics computed for 2004 and 2005

- Delay metric can be normalized vs. seasonal-average (e.g. 2004's)
- Normalized *cost* (ORI) is a useful additional metric

WITI calculation refined for both en-route and terminal parts

Delay/Cost metrics should account for traffic demand, not just weather, if used as NAS/ATM performance indicators

- 10-15% traffic demand increase can cause 45-60% increase in delays
- Slightly better NAS/ATM performance in 2005 if *both* weather *and* traffic demand are taken into account

These metrics can advance our understanding of NAS response to external impacts

![](_page_18_Picture_10.jpeg)

# NAS Response to External Impacts

![](_page_19_Figure_1.jpeg)

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![](_page_20_Picture_0.jpeg)

# **Back-up Slides**

![](_page_20_Picture_2.jpeg)

### Operational Response Index (ORI) Components

![](_page_21_Picture_1.jpeg)

Using *direct* carrier costs only

• Passenger impact (value of pax time, 'ill will', re-issuing tickets etc) excluded

Flights per day: OPSNet daily totals (varies between 37,000 and 50,000)

• Simplifying assumption: all aircraft are *narrowbodies* 

#### Cost of 1 Minute of Delay

• Used \$22/min (based on total non-fuel operating costs averaged for a narrowbody jet)

Cost of 1 Extra Mile Flown (expressed in \$/min)

 Equivalent to \$18/min (based on 2004 fuel cost average for a narrowbody in cruise at \$1.25 / gallon)

Cost of a [Narrowbody] Cancellation

• US carrier-reported average cost was \$4,500 in '94 which equates to \$6,000 per cancellation in 2004

Cost of a [Narrowbody] Diversion

 Assuming 4 hrs extra block time and a \$2,500 hourly operating cost for a narrowbody, we get \$10,000 per diversion

Sources: OIG; BTS; MITRE CAASD; FAA APO; FAA OPSNet database

![](_page_21_Picture_15.jpeg)

### **Operational Response Index (ORI)** *Calculation*

![](_page_22_Picture_1.jpeg)

ORI = (Num\_fl \* Avg Δ<sub>dist</sub> \* Avg\_fuelburn \* Fuel\_cost + Num\_fl \* Avg Δ<sub>time</sub> \* Avg\_nonfuel\_oper\_cost Num\_diversions \* Avg\_cost\_of\_diversion + Num\_Cancellations \* Avg\_cost\_of\_cancellation) / Num\_fl

where:

$$\begin{split} &\Delta_{dist} = \text{average excess distance per flight (actual vs. flight-planned)} \\ &\Delta_{time} = \text{average excess block time per flight (actual vs. scheduled)} \\ &\text{Avg_fuelburn} = \text{fuelburn for a generic narrowbody jet in cruise at FL330} \\ &\text{Num_fl} = \text{daily number of OPSNet flights} \end{split}$$

Sources of data: FAA APO Lab; FAA ASPM

![](_page_22_Picture_6.jpeg)

#### Operational Response Index – Reality Check Comparison with \$\$ Quoted in Literature

![](_page_23_Picture_1.jpeg)

For OPSNet flights:

- Total "excess airline cost" for 2004 (all flights, all days) is \$4.6B
- For a baseline "ideal" day (ORI = \$150/flight):

if all days in 2004 were like it, total cost would have been \$2.7B

#### Difference = \$1.9B in *direct* operating costs

References show comparable excess-cost estimates:

- "Some figures have indicated that the total average *direct* annual costs of the irregular operations of ten U.S. major airlines for the period 1996-1999 have been about \$1.9B" (M.Janic TRB Report, 2003)
- "...the Air Transport Association estimated that delays cost the air carriers approximately **\$2.0B** in *direct* operating costs in 1999": OIG Report, 2000
- "The Air Transport Association's amount increases to nearly **\$5B** when **in**direct costs and the value of passengers' lost time are included": OIG Report, 2000 (*extrapolation of our calculations to include indirect costs produces comparable numbers AK*)
- Total operating costs of delays: \$1.8-2.4B in 1987-94: FAA APO-130, "Total Cost for Air Carrier Delay Report", 1996
- 1999 total cost of disruptions estimated at \$1.8B (Z.Shavell Effects of Schedule Disruptions on the Economics of Airline Operations. In: Air Transportation Systems Engineering, 2001, Chapter 8).

![](_page_23_Picture_13.jpeg)

2005 Delay/Wx: Linear vs. Exponential Trend A Sign of a Worsening Delay Situation?

![](_page_24_Picture_1.jpeg)

Exponential trendline: a better fit for 2005 Delay-vs-Weather Plot?

Linear trendline is a better fit for 2004 data

![](_page_24_Figure_4.jpeg)

![](_page_24_Picture_5.jpeg)

### "Quiet Period" Monthly ASPM Delays vs. Ops 1995-2005

![](_page_25_Figure_1.jpeg)

![](_page_25_Picture_2.jpeg)

# **Terminal Capacity Degradation**

![](_page_26_Picture_1.jpeg)

Weather factor Available airport capacity, % nominal

- THUNDERSTORM 10
- HEAVY\_SNOW 30
- HIGH\_WIND (>30 kt)\* 30
- HEAVY\_RAIN 40
- LOW\_VISIBILITY 70
- LOW\_CEILING 70
- SNOW 70
- RAIN 70
- WIND (20-30 kt) 70
- NO\_WEATHER 100

\*sustained wind above 30 kt, higher gusts

![](_page_26_Picture_14.jpeg)

## "Flows" and Actual Tracks Similarity

![](_page_27_Picture_1.jpeg)

![](_page_27_Picture_2.jpeg)