
The Mother Metric?



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FAA has set a performance target to "implement by FY 2006 a single, comprehensive index that provides a meaningful measure of the safety performance of the US civil aviation system."

Let's consider now some general suggestions relevant to this endeavor.

(1) When the safety index is reported, it should be accompanied by reports about its *individual components*.

(2) The indicator should strive to exude simplicity.

Measure of Safety Performance Over a Past Period:

Death Risk Per Randomly Chosen Flight

Question:

If a person chooses a flight at random from among those of interest (e.g. US domestic jet flights over the period 1990-99), what is the probability that he will not survive it?

This death risk per flight statistic is simple, and has conceptual advantages compared to some other safety indicators.

What Conceptual Advantages?

• Ignores length and duration of flight, which are virtually unrelated to mortality risk

• Weights each crash by the percentage of passengers killed

• Easy to calculate with readily-available data

First-World Domestic Jet Services

Death Risk per Flight, 1990-99:

1 in 13 million

At a mortality risk of 1 in 13 million per flight, a passenger who took one flight per day would on average travel for 36,000 years before dying in a plane crash.

(3) In places where calculations can be done in two or more equally plausible ways, there is a strong case for *sensitivity analysis*.

Let's consider a specific question:

___Are some major US jet carriers systematically safer than others?

To investigate this issue, we consider NTSB data about accidents and serious incidents over the 20-year span 1983-2002.

(There were about 500 such events.)

We focus on *domestic* passenger jet services, and the seven largest US carriers:

AA, CO, DL, NW, UA, US, WN

In total, these seven carriers suffered 6.40 full-crash equivalents (FCE's) caused by accidents over the 20-year period, out of 83 million flights.

(In computing FCE's, we weight each plane crash by the **proportion** of those on board who perished in the accident.)

Accident-caused Full-crash Equivalents for the seven carriers, 1983-2002

<u>Airline</u>	Proportionate Share	Actual FCE's
AA	1.05	0.08
CO	0.58	0.34
DL	1.24	0.97
NW	0.70	1.17
UA	1.01	1.39
US	1.02	2.46
WN	0.82	0

These variations between proportionate shares and actual FCE's can easily be explained as chance fluctuations associated with rare events.

For another perspective on the "equal safety" question, we use a technique for evaluating baseball players that was described in the book Moneyball.

Under a "just desserts" principle, we assigned to each airline the 20-year average mortality rate for each dangerous event it encountered (e.g. for each in-flight loss of control).

"Luck Adjusted" Full-Crash Equivalents for Seven Carriers, 1983-2002 (Accidents Only)

	Proportionate	"Just Desserts"
<u>Airline</u>	Share	Share
AA	1.05	1.34
CO	0.58	0.88
DL	1.24	1.34
NW	0.70	0.65
UA	1.01	0.96
US	1.02	0.89
WN	0.82	0.35

The "just desserts" scores--based on hundred of events-- are far closer to the equal-safety FCE shares than were the actual scores based on very few events. However, they depend on a questionable axiom.

Neither of these analyses is ideal. But, taken together, they offer greater insight than either one on its own. That outcome illustrates the value of sensitivity analysis.

(4) No indicator is perfect.

("The best is the enemy of the good.")

A Tentative Thought for the Composite Index:

For a randomly-chosen person living in the US and a randomly-chosen US flight over the period of interest, what is the probability that the person dies because of a mishap involving the flight?