



The Dynamics of the Emerging Capacity Crisis in the US Air Traffic Control System

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


US Capacity Issue

- **The US Air Transportation system is approaching a critical saturation threshold where nominal interruptions (e.g. weather) result in a nonlinear amplification of delay**
 - **US and Regional Economies highly dependant on Air Transportation**
 - † Business travel (stimulated by info technology)
 - † Air Freight
 - † Personal travel
 - **System is highly complex and interdependent**
 - **Need better understanding of system dynamics and real constraints to guide and justify efforts to upgrade NAS**
 - **Current efforts will not provide capacity to meet demand**
 - **Impact of upcoming capacity crisis is not well understood**
 - † Operational Impact
 - † Economic Impact
-




Increased Traffic Demand



Source: BTS Historical Annual Air Traffic Data




Classic Delay vs Demand Curve






Decreasing Aircraft Size



Source: DOT Form 41 Data




Increased Flights



Source: DOT Form 41 Data




Delays in 2000 Are Worse Than In 1999





Typical US Traffic Situation Daytime (5500 Tracked Flights)






European Departure Delays (1999)

• Dep Apt	% Flts Delayed	Average Delay (min)
• Bologna	47	34.5
• Milan/Malpensa	42	30.5
• Palma Mallorca	35	34.9
• Geneva	40	26.7
• Milan/Linate	39	27.7
• Zurich	41	23.8
• Nice	33	28.1
• Tenerife	30	28.4
• Lyon	36	24.0
• Basel	32	26.1
• Madrid	31	26.9
• Barcelona	27	30.0
• Athens	24	30.2
• Brussels	31	23.3
• Munich	27	25.5

source: Eurocontrol (IHT4/1/00)



Consumer Complaints



Source: FAA Air Travel Consumer Report




Human Factors and Adaptation

- **ATM is a human centered contract process for the allocation of airspace and airport surface resources.**
 - **Current NAS has evolved over 60 years**
 - **The system has significant local adaptations resulting in nonhomogeneity**
 - † Airspace design
 - † Local procedures
 - † Letters of agreement
 - † Noise restrictions
 - † Site specific training (FPL = 3-5 years)
 - **Major operational changes were event driven, enabled by technical capability**
 - † Positive radar control - Grand Canyon 1956
 - † TCAS - Los Cerritos 1982
-




New York Arrival and Departure Tracks





Bay Area Flow Pattern (West Flow)





Capacity Limit Factors

- **Airport Capacity**
 - † Runways
 - † Gates
 - † Landside Limits
 - † Weather
 - **Airspace Capacity**
 - † Airspace Design
 - † Controller Workload
 - † Balkanization
 - **Demand**
 - † Peak Demand
 - † Hub & Spoke Networks
 - **Environmental Limits**
 - † Noise (relates to Airport)
 - † Emissions (local, Ozone, NOX, CO2)
-




Schedule Factors

- **Peak Demand/Capacity issue driven (in part) by airline Hub and Spoke scheduling behavior**
 - † Peak demand often exceeds airport IFR capacity (VFR/IFR Limits)
 - † Depend on bank spreading and lulls to recover
 - † Hub and Spoke amplifies delay
 - **Hub and spoke is an efficient network**
 - † Supports weak demand markets
 - **Schedules driven by competitive/market factors**
 - † Operations respond to marketing
 - † Trend to more frequent services, smaller aircraft
 - † Ratchet behavior
 - † Impact of regional jets
 - **Ultimately, airlines will schedule rationally**
 - † To delay tolerance of the market (delay homeostasis)
 - **Limited federal or local mechanisms to regulate schedule**
-

The Impact of Delays on Gate Congestion


Comparison of Scheduled vs. Actual Gate Usage on April 20, 1998 (American Airlines)



- Gate congestion was above scheduled at the end of the day due to an apparent missed arrival wave around 1730
- Not only was the peak higher, but it was sustained for a longer period of time




Hub and Spoke Network



Completely Connected Network = $2(N-1)$ Flights
(eg., 50 Airports, 98 Flights)



Fully Connected Network




Completely Connected Network = $N(N-1)$
(eg., 50 Airports, 2450 Flights)



ATL Schedule (July 99)

Atlanta

Average Daily Arrivals and Departures
July 1999




Source: ATA Website




Airport System Capacity Limit Factors

- **Runways**
- **Weather**
 - † Capacity Variability
- **Gates**
- **Downstream Constraints**
- **Controller Workload**
- **Landside Limits**
 - † Terminals
 - † Road Access
- **Environmental**
 - † Community Noise
 - † Emissions
- **Safety**





ACARS Constraint Identification (Departure)





Separation Requirements for Arrival (Same Runway)

- **Wake Turbulence Requirement**

- † Radar Separation requirements

		Trailing Aircraft		
		Heavy	Large	Small
Leading Aircraft	Heavy	4	5	5
	B757	4	4	5
	Large	3(2.5)	3(2.5)	4
	Small	3(2.5)	3(2.5)	3(2.5)

- † Visual Separation requirements

- ◆ Pilots Discretion


- **Preceding arrival must be clear of runway at touchdown**

- † Runway Occupancy time



BOS Queuing Model


27/22L-22R Configuration







Runway Configuration Capacity Envelops

Runway Configuration Capacity Envelops
(Source: ETMS / Tower Records, 7-9 AM, 4-8 PM, July 1-15 1998 except Saturdays, Logan Airport)







Capacity Example (50 Flights/hr)







Capacity Example (40 Flights/hr)






Capacity Example (30 Flights/hr)





Airport System Capacity Limit Factors


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
Variable Capacity Effects

1995 Delays vs Operations





Effect of Capacity Variability









Collaborative Convective Weather Forecast

Collaborative
Convective
Forecast
Product

Valid Time:
May 24, 2000 21Z

Issuance Time:
May 24, 2000 15Z


TSTM COVERAGE AND
DOWNWIND DENIED AREA:

SOLID 
 HIGH = 74-100% 
 MED = 50-74% 
 LOW = 25-49% 

TOPS:
100's OF FEET

GROWTH:
 ++ = FAST POSITIVE
 + = POSITIVE
 NC = NO CHANGE
 - = NEGATIVE


PROB OF OCCURENCE:
 HIGH = 70 - 100%
 MED = 40 - 69%
 LOW = 1 - 39%





Airport System Capacity Limit Factors


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


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Flight Count			
Arr	Dep	Actv	Visib
ALL	ALL	5822	109
ORD	ALL	165	109



Times	
Current:	1845
Flights:	1844
Tops:	1820
Lightning:	1840
NOWRAD2:	1840


UF5718
1104/BATP/A
51/250
CWA ORD

LAL108
3108/B763/E
23/510
LAX ORD

AAL1596
211330/B752/I
41/478
MMM ORD




Blocking






Downstream Flow Constraints






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


ATC Workload as a System Constraint






Inter-Facility Coordination





Communication Structure of the New York TRACON TMC






Current System Structure Lacks Flexibility

- **Current Responsibility Structure Balkanized**
 - † Safety is key objective
 - † Position is to protect safety and integrity of “own” unit
 - † High priority in avoiding overloading own facility
 - † Ambiguity between Command Center and TMC Authority
 - **Lack of “System” concern**
 - **Negotiation process is adversarial**
 - † Protect own position.
 - † Importance of personal contact
 - **Extremely difficult to conduct negotiations with more than 2 agents in real-time.**
 - **Results in imposition of rigid constraints in the interest of safety.**
 - **Opportunity for information sharing and tools for Inter-Facility CDM at the tactical level**
-



Airport System Capacity Limit Factors


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




Community Noise Impact

- **Example: Louisville Runway**

- † 30 > 70 ops/hr
- † Runway
 - ◆ \$447 M
- † Property within 65 DNL
 - ◆ \$350 M




BOS (4R Departure)



Runway Saturation Effect (N Control)

$\bar{T}_5(t+6 \text{ min.})$ as a function of $N_{\text{dep}}(t)$ in configuration 9 (ASQP data, Boston Logan, 1996)





Runway Departure Queue Costs Boston, Logan Airport

- The estimated runway queueing time translates into:
 - \$ 6.1 million in Direct Operating Costs,
 - significant pollutant emissions:
 - ➔ 28 tons of HC,
 - ➔ 136.4 tons of CO,
 - ➔ 22.0 tons of NO_x.
- Pollutant emissions from runway queueing are equivalent to between 9,440 and 22,330 cars visiting the airport every day.

Pollutant	Runway queue Emissions per year	Equivalent car miles per year	Equivalent car round trips per day
HC	28.0 tons	9.7 million	14,710
CO	136.4 tons	6.2 million	9,440
NO _x	22.0 tons	14.7 million	22,330


Table 6: Environmental impact of current runway queueing.

Obstacles: DOT Performance Reporting, Gates, Culture



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


Safety vs Capacity

- **The current airborne system is extremely safe but conservative**
 - **Increased capacity with current infrastructure implies Reduced Operational Separation**
 - † Airborne Separation Standards
 - † Runway Occupancy Times
 - † Wake Vortex
 - † Controller Personal Buffers
 - † ...
 - **How do you dependably predict the safety impact of changes in a complex interdependent system?**
 - † Statistics of small numbers
 - † Differential analysis limited to small or isolated changes
 - † Models??
 - **Safety Veto Effect**
 - **Runway Incursions are an area of concern**
-




SEPARATION ASSURANCE CONSIDERATIONS






EN ROUTE MINIMA HAVE NOT CHANGED DESPITE 5 x IMPROVEMENT IN RADAR PERFORMANCE






IMPROVED SURVEILLANCE HAS NOT LED TO REDUCED EN ROUTE MINIMA

WHEN STANDARDS WERE DEVELOPED
(e.g. 1950s for en route radar)



IMPROVED SURVEILLANCE ENVIRONMENT
(e.g. today for en route radar)


Minimum Separation Standard



- Surveillance has improved, but separation minima have not changed: procedural safety buffer has implicitly increased



Proposed CNS/ATM Information Technologies





Capacity Increase Potential Free Flight Phase 1

- **Collaborative Decision Making**
 - † Improved Coordination of Limited Resources
 - **URET Conflict Probe**
 - † No Direct Impact
 - **Traffic Management Advisor**
 - † Improved Runway Balancing
 - † Flow Coordination
 - **p FAST**
 - † Runway Load Balancing
 - † Runway Schedule Compression (10-15%)
 - **Surface Movement Advisor**
 - † Limited Gate Coordination
 - **Controller Pilot Datalink Communication (CPDLC)**
 - † No Direct Impact
-



Suggested Political Solutions to Capacity Shortfall

- **Full or Partial Privatization (eg AIR-21)**
 - † May improve modernization, costs and strategic management
 - † Limited impact on capacity
 - **Re-regulation**
 - † Increased Costs to Consumer
 - **Peak Demand Pricing**
 - † Reduced service to weak markets
 - † Need to insure that revenues go to improved capacity
 - **Run System Tighter**
 - † Requires improved CNS
 - † Safety vs Capacity Trade
 - **Build more capacity**
 - † Local community resistance
 - **Multi-modal transportation networks**
-



Conclusion

- **Technology in Pipeline will have limited impact on peak Capacity at Currently Stressed Airports**
 - † 20% to 40% Optimistically
 - **System will become (is) Capacity Restricted**
 - **Airlines will Schedule in Response to Market Demand**
 - † Delay Homeostasis
 - † Increased Traffic at Secondary Airports
 - † High Frequency Service
 - **Overall system response is not clear**
 - **Protection of Airport and Spectrum Resources**
 - **Need more runways in critical locations**
 - **Need for new ATM paradigms**
 - **Need for leadership**
-